What Can You Do With A Nuclear Bully?

We now have sufficient confirmation that during the hugely successful Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2022 the US got an indication that Russia might use a nuclear device in order to prevent total collapse on the battlefield. This information strongly affirmed Washington’s feeling that beating Russia is almost impossible, and that any attempt might lead to rapid nuclear escalation.

This was a hugely pivotal moment in world history, but I don't think it gets that kind of recognition.

Previously, according to Russian military doctrine, a nuclear attack was supposed to be initiated only if Russia itself was under threat. After 2022, this was amended to include a collapse of Russia's military ability—even outside of Russia.

It is one thing that Russia made this announcement, but quite another thing that the West accepted it, because it set in place an entirely new war paradigm. Any attack on a nearby country by Russia's conventional forces could now be followed by the threat of a nuclear strike if significant resistance is demonstrated by the victim or its allies. With this new playbook Russia completely controls escalation. Russia can escalate by invading, but the invaded party is forced to de-escalate in fear of nuclear disaster.

It might be said that Russia’s Zapad 2009 exercise, playing out a scenario of a nuclear attack on Warsaw, was a precursor for the way Russia currently wages war on Ukraine. We had plenty of warning to prepare for the following escalations, but instead we were caught off guard when they came.

It follows that it would not be too wild of me to suggest that Russia had two plans ready on the night before their attack on Ukraine in 2022. Plan A, clearly too optimistic, was to take Kyiv in three days. This plan was foiled by the determination of Ukraine's leadership and their own people, more than by the West’s response. But it looks like Russia had a Plan B to switch to if things went wrong—nuclear blackmail.

And here is the point of failure, that even though we witnessed Zapad in 2009 and had extensive knowledge of the mindset of Russia’s elite, we were not prepared for that Plan B. We didn't meet Russia's nuclear blackmail with pushback, we didn't introduce strategic costs or dilemmas for Russia in the event of such escalation. No, we instead allowed Russia to escalate, not only the war in Ukraine, but also the shadow war in the Baltics and elsewhere, all the while repeating publicly that we got the message from Moscow and we are inclined to do as Russia requests. 

What is even more concerning to me now are the announcements that Chinese involvement has been instrumental in persuading Russia to stop considering the nuclear option. Just imagine what sort of leverage this gives China. Now China and not the US (or EU for that matter) is the security guarantor of the European continent. Let that sink in.

On one hand, it is easy to understand the sentiment which says that China has to be involved in the peace process in Ukraine. Clearly, if we are unable to deter Russian nuclear escalation and only China can do that, people start considering that maybe China should be invited to become the security guarantor for Ukraine.

On the other hand, and there is always another hand, just imagine the price tag on such a request. One does not need to look far, just take the latest EU vote on tariffs for Chinese electric vehicles. It wasn't an easy task to get the required majority of countries in the EU to support the Commission's proposal. Afterwards, China threatened to treat the countries that voted in favour differently when it comes to trade deals, so it will be even more difficult to find a majority the next time around. Now you see what will happen to EU sovereignty if we outsource the security of our continent to China. 

All of this raises some very dire strategic questions. If Russia is able to blackmail the US and NATO into refraining from fully assisting a devastated and brutally invaded neighbour, is it possible that Russia could repeat this trick on NATO territory?

Usually I get the answer “NATO territory is different, the nuclear umbrella works.”

Indeed it does work, until it doesn't. Would allies want to risk a nuclear disaster for a piece of land—not even the whole country—somewhere in the Baltics? The excellent “salami tactics” episode of Yes, Prime Minister rings eerily true today.

Adviser: So will you press the button if they invade West Berlin?

Prime Minister: It all depends.

Adviser: On what? Scenario one. Riots in West Berlin, buildings in flames. East German fire brigade crosses the border to help. Would you press the button...? The East German police come with them. The button...? Then some troops, more troops just for riot control, they say. And then the East German troops are replaced by Russian troops. Button...?

I do understand that the US might be tired and might feel divided after the "forever wars”. It’s expected that a country doesn't want to entangle itself in a new conflict that doesn’t look totally winnable.

But if this understandable reaction becomes a deep-rooted ideological belief, the world changes direction. Blind faith in “disengagement” allows malign actors all the operational space they want. If that happens, we all lose, not just Ukraine, Afghan women or Europe (which was and is obliged to do more), but also the US itself. There will inevitably be conflicts in the future where the US or its allies' interests will be challenged, and decisions taken in the last three years only served to make these conflicts a bit more likely and a bit more dangerous. 

So the main question is this: What can you do with a nuclear bully? I see two reasonable responses.

The first is to recognise that the new Russian nuclear doctrine means there are no more grey zones of countries outside security alliances. You are either covered by the Allied umbrella or Russia will use its own nuclear weapons to blackmail you. So, in this regard, Ukraine’s request of NATO membership or similar security guarantees is the plan that makes the most sense. And clearly if this does not happen, talk of acquiring a nuclear weapon themselves—even if it takes decades—would actually be an understandable reaction, and one that I am sure many non-nuclear, non-allied countries are considering.

Successful nuclear blackmail is bringing the non-proliferation age to its end. We should not be surprised to see more talk, and possibly more proliferation, if in this emerging new reality we leave vulnerable countries to fend for themselves. 

The second response we must give is to stop gifting strategic clarity to Russia. In other words, we must shroud our strategy in ambiguity. Again, we can look to Yes, Prime Minister for enlightenment.

Sir Humphrey: With Trident we could obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.

Prime Minister: I don't want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.

Sir Humphrey: But it's a deterrent.

Prime Minister: It's a bluff. I probably wouldn't use it.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, but they don't know that you probably wouldn't.

Prime Minister: They probably do.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn't. But they can't certainly know.

Prime Minister: They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn't.

Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn't, they don't certainly know that although you probably wouldn't, there is no probability that you certainly would!

The only thing that should be made clear to Russia is that we have extremely effective ways of inflicting huge pain on Russia's armed forces, economy and international reach. NATO’s Cold War strategic concept of “deterrence by punishment” should be back in fashion.

Contrary to the deep-rooted beliefs of some parties, Russian escalation should always be met with escalation. Our huge combined economy and military power would quickly make this brinkmanship untenable for Russia.

It bears repeating that we have always had the ability to limit Russia’s activity in the Baltic Sea, to deny them operating space in Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, the Middle East or Africa. We have always had the ability to impose and enforce sanctions that would bring the economy to a standstill, but we chose not to. We have always had the ability to announce that any nuclear threats will be met with unprecedented force. We have always had conventional and cyber tools to make sure the message is well understood. We have always had the ability to keep the escalation spiral firmly under our control and with that deter Russia from even considering the nuclear option. Unfortunately this is not where we are currently at. 

Let all of this be a lesson for all of us—we are stronger than we are led to believe. if Ukrainians had believed what they were told, that they were too weak to survive, that Zelenskyy needs a ride—there would now be no Ukraine. Zelenskyy believed in ammo, and Ukraine still exists. In turn, we must not buy into the thoroughly debunked belief that the only way to deal with a crocodile is to feed it.